The article explores the interaction between legal and political strategy in producing social change. It centres on a long-running dispute in Australia over whether charities can have a dominant political purpose. The focus is on the strategising of the small activist charity that successfully pursued the case over a five-year period. As an 'insider' account, the article charts the in-practice process of translating activisms across legal and political fields. With a stress on contingency and agency, the account affirms a 'politics of rights' approach to legal activism. It shows how the case opened-up new grounds for political contestation, and as such offered prospects for 'non-reformist reform'. It also demonstrates how this occurred more by strategic engagement with unintended effects, than necessarily by design.
In doing so, the paper addresses dilemmas between legal and political activism, within 'rights' framing, and beyond it.
As will become clear, there are many individuals from the NGO sector and amongst legal firms and in universities whose encouragement, sound advice and personal commitment played a central role in ensuring the case was pursued. One individual should be mentioned at the outset: the late Professor Mark Lyons, my former colleague at UTS, and authority on the not-for-profit sector in Australia, who encouraged us at every step. In 2003 he had commented 'From time to time the ATO has stripped a nonprofit organisation of its charity status on the ground that it transgressed the lobbying prohibition. These occasions are few and attract no attention' (Lyons 2003, p.1) . With Aid/Watch, between 2006 and 2009 he played a key role in proving himself wrong. Unfortunately he passed away before the Federal Court Judgement was overturned.
Legal and political activism 'in translation'
In capitalist societies formal legal equality is in permanent tension with substantive inequality: paradoxically, formal equality enforces and institutionalises real inequalities. The extension of legal rights, from property rights, to political, social and cultural rights, reflects the extension of liberal principles across social fields (Marshall 1950 (Marshall /1973 . The deepening Lockean contract does not supersede substantive inequalities, yet it renders them politically visible and open to challenge (Woods 1995) . That challenge may come 'from within', for instance in the form of legal activism; or it may come externally, through political activism.
In debates about legal reform a continuum may be constructed between legal activism that limits itself to extrapolating existing legal principles, to political activism that aims to delegitimise the law, a form of immanent critique in the name of higher political norms. Legal activism seeks to extend rights observance, the assumption being that the legal regime can ameliorate the system that produces it. Taken alone, though, legal activism may enable de-radicalisation, cooptation and normalisation, entrenching the very power sources that are ostensibly being targeted (Lobel 2006) . The target of immanent critique is the political system as a whole, and the legislative process as part of it, rather than legal authority per se. Pearson and Salter describe it as an 'effort to turn the normative standards that a legal ideology employs back upon the institutional procedures and actions which are supposed to embody these standards… [It] can involve taking a measure promising 'equal' rights 'at its word' even, or rather especially, where the underlying institutional intention was never to fully realise this ideal' (Pearson and Salter 1999, p. 484 ). An example is the call for 'animal rights' for 'enemy combatants' at the Guantanamo Bay military jail on the basis that dogs received better treatment at the jail than the human detainees (Zevnik 2011 ).
Clearly, legal and political activism can be linked. Legal activism on its own may proceed independently of political agency, but only within the existing legal framework. Shifting that framework requires political activism directed at publics beyond the immediate legal process.
Immanent critique on its own is also inadequate: critiques may have wide political resonance, but are highly contingent. Extralegal activism, in a 'sphere of alternative social activism', may vacate the legal field in favour of a performative politics, which can lack traction (Lobel 2006, p. 981) .
Even if exposing contradictions forces regime change, a legal remedy is not guaranteed (and Guantanamo Bay may be a case in point).
Most often, though, the problem is of legal cooptation, where political movements give way to legislative initiatives, with political aspirations subsumed by legal norms. The diversion of political conflict into the pursuit of rights norms, in particular, can offer slim pickings: two cases that have received attention in the US, for instance, are labour movement demands during the 1930s New Deal era, and the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, both of which are said to have been de-radicalised in the face of the legal rights bestowed upon them (Lobel 2007) . To guard against cooptation, Scheingold, in his classic 1974 text, argued for a focus on the 'politics of rights' rather than rights as abstract legal claims (Scheingold 1974 (Scheingold /2004 . The politics of rights rejects the distinction between law and politics and puts political-legal strategising in the driving seat, offering the possibility of more sustained transformation. Yet the balance is a difficult one, especially given the in-built elitism of the legal profession, in tension with political activism, which relies on the mobilisation of broader publics.
Strategising between political and legal fields becomes a precondition for the kind of 'nonreformist reforms' favoured by Andre Gorz. The alternation should perhaps be understood as a process of strategic 'translation', from legal into political fields and vice versa (Paris 2006 (Paris , p. 1029 . Legal activism centres on the conduct of particular cases as they pass through various levels of judicial authority; political activism is also highly episodic, moving across issues and agendas according to the political process. The process of translation between the two is thus an active and on-going process of seeking to capture the agenda, a process which can be tracked and mapped. As a subjective engagement, the process involves individuals in strategic manoeuvres, in seeking-out 'strategic possibilities hidden within the concrete particularity of issues and movements' (Hunt 1990, p. 361) . What is attempted here is a personalised mapping, to draw out the twists and turns across political and legal categories in the process of building a snowballing 'non-reformist reform'. Before embarking on this narrative, the following section provides some context on issue of charities and politics in Australia.
Charitable status and advocacy in Australia
The conservative Coalition that governed Australia 1996 Australia -2007 came to power with a mandate to rule for the 'mainstream' against 'special interests', as represented by advocacy NGOs. NGO elites were seen as impinging on the capacity of elected governments to govern for the mass of the populace, undermining economic efficiency and distorting the workings of the market (Staples 2007; Phillips 2006) . The Coalition explicitly identified advocacy NGOs as unaccountable and self-serving, and sought to reduce their influence (Mowbray 2003) . NGOs dependent on government funding were especially vulnerable: these were deemed to have violated public trust if they publicly criticized government policy, and could only advocate for individual cases, chilling public debate (see Maddison and Hamilton 2006) .
Dependence on charitable donations from individuals and foundations was another source of vulnerability. Advocacy NGOs are often expert-based rather than member-based, and are particularly dependent on charitable status. For these organizations the capacity to establish and maintain a presence, and thus to influence the public sphere, can hinge on access to tax concessions. Government efforts to contain charitable status began in 2001, when the government initiated an inquiry into 'The Definition of Charities and Related Organizations' headed by a former judge, Ian Sheppard. The inquiry assessed what changes were necessary to ensure the legal definition of charities remained relevant to the contemporary environment, and unexpectedly recommended the definition of 'charitable purpose' be broadened. The inquiry found that advocacy could be a core element of charitable activity, provided it furthered or was 'in aid of... charitable purpose or purposes': any activity was acceptable provided it was not 'illegal', 'contrary to public policy', or involved promoting 'a political party or a candidate for political office ' (Commonwealth of Australia 2001, p.108) .
In 2003 the Federal Government published its 'Draft Charities Bill', rejecting Sheppard's recommendations on advocacy. Within the Bill, under Section 8, a set of 'Disqualifying purposes' was created that included 'the purpose of attempting to change the law or government policy' (Commonwealth of . The Government referred the Bill to the Federal Taxation Board for public consultation, and about 260 submissions were submitted, mostly from the charitable sector. For many of these, the Bill's impact on advocacy was a central concern. For instance, Philanthropy Australia, a peak group representing 217 organisations, argued that: 'To exclude lobbying, advocacy or activities designed to achieve changes in government policy or legislation, is to take charities back 40 years. Such an exclusion would severely limit the effectiveness of many organizations… ' (Philanthropy Australia 2003) .
In its final report, the Tax Board described Section 8 as 'the most controversial section of the draft Bill', and added, 'concerns about Section 8 reflect the view that the Section may operate to limit the advocacy activities of charitable bodies. Respondents saw this possibility as significant because of the widely-expressed view that advocacy is of vital importance to the operations of the modern charitable sector' (Federal Taxation Board 2004, p.13) . A key issue was the relationship between activities and purposes, and the extent to which a disqualifying purpose could be inferred from activities (Federal Taxation Board 2004, p. overseas. However the ATO cited three activities of the organisation that it believed were not consistent with charitable status. These three 'political' activities were: urging the public to write to the Government to put pressure on the Burmese regime; delivering an (ironic) 60th anniversary birthday cake to the World Bank; and raising concerns about the developmental impacts of the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement. The ATO claimed the three activities were more than incidental to Aid/Watch's charitable purpose and demonstrated that Aid/Watch had a 'separate, political purpose'. 
Internal ATO Appeal -2007
The political context in which Aid/Watch was selected for disqualification influenced the approach taken internally. With the help of a pro-bono lawyer, Aid/Watch lodged an internal ATO appeal in late 2006 against the disqualification. In the meantime Aid/Watch also looked at the possibility of revising its constitution in order to make clear that its activities conformed to ATO guidelines. This conciliatory approach was forced off the table when the ATO responded to the Aid/Watch appeal by arguing that some of Aid/Watch purposes were disqualifying political purposes, as well as the three cited activities.
3 Further, at a mediation later required by the AAT, argued that 'all of the applicant's objects seek to change law or policy', and hence that all of the Aid/Watch purposes were political (ATO 2008, para 3.4).
The AAT appeal was a major task for Aid/Watch as it required extensive evidence, linked to legal arguments that the organization conformed to the existing common law on the definition of charity. Importantly, the process of making the argument from within the existing legal framework was in some tension with the political stance that charities had the right to speak out.
The legal argument at the AAT turned on whether Aid/Watch sought to propagandize for changes in the law, or undertook monitoring, research and campaigning to improve the administration of the aid program. In some respects, the organization would defend the right to do either or both of these: the argument that charities should be allowed to speak out does not discriminate on how they do this. At the AAT though, Aid/Watch argued its activities were not aimed at changing the law, but rather at helping the government implement AusAID's policy commitment to alleviating poverty and promoting environmental sustainability.
The two-day hearing involved two large legal teams, an Aid/Watch witness, and Justice Downes.
The ATO had trawled through the Aid/Watch website, and had made several requests for internal documents, including funding applications, notes from planning sessions, and minutes of meetings. Several additional papers, mined from the Aid/Watch website, were unexpectedly tabled on the day. The judgement, when it came, was in favour of Aid/Watch: its purposes were found to be directed to the relief of poverty and the advancement of education, and also otherwise of benefit to the public; its political activities were found to be 'encouraging' the realization of existing government policy on aid, not 'opposing' it (AAT 2008: para 6). Significantly, the judgement explicitly stated that Aid/Watch did not have to distribute aid in order to be charitable:
'the objects are charitable notwithstanding the fact that Aid/Watch does not itself provide aid'
(AAT 2008, para 7).
The AAT hearing was to prove invaluable as it set a benchmark establishing the 'facts of the case': in formal terms subsequent appeals could only be pursued on the basis of legal arguments, as against questions of fact. For Aid/Watch this was welcome, as it meant there would be no need for further evidence to be presented. In large part, from then on, direct participation in the legal case was in the hands of the lawyers.
Federal Court -2009
In responding to the AAT judgement the ATO insisted that Aid/Watch was still no longer a charity, and signaled it would appeal to the Federal Court. To overturn the judgement the ATO needed Aid/Watch to mount a defence, and hence had to concede that the matter was a test case for the sector. As such, the Aid/Watch legal defence at the Federal Court was funded from the ATO's 'Test Case Litigation Program', and Aid/Watch was indemnified against the ATO's legal costs. For the organization, then, the ATO's Federal Court appeal had minimal impact: the case was defended against the ATO solely through legal arguments centring on charity law, and given the test case funding, there was no financial risk to the Committee of Management.
The real risk, though, was that the ATO would succeed in their appeal, and this risk was now not simply to Aid/Watch, but to the sector as a whole. The case was being treated as a test case, and the ATO, in their submissions, were clearly seeking to deepen the ban on political charity. On the question of whether there was a disqualifying political purpose, though, the court agreed with the ATO, arguing that Aid/Watch had a dominant political purpose because its constitution seeks 'to ensure' that aid alleviates poverty. The Court fully accepted this argument:
'Aid/Watch's attempt to persuade the government (however indirectly) to its point of view necessarily involves criticism of, and an attempt to bring about change in, government activity and, in some cases, government policy. There can be little doubt that this is political activity and that behind this activity is a political purpose. Moreover the activity is Aid/Watch's main activity 
High Court Appeal -2010
With the High Court appeal pending, the financial risk to Aid/Watch had multiplied. If Aid/Watch lost the High Court appeal, the Government Solicitor would most likely seek to recover costs, both from the appeal and from the special leave application, a total bill approaching $300,000.
Aid/Watch lawyers again submitted an application to the ATO for test case funding, this time arguing that given the High Court would now hear the appeal, the case had indeed become a test case for the sector.
Ironically enough, Aid/Watch was unable to take its appeal against the ATO without the ATO funding. If the ATO refused to fund the case, Aid/Watch could have argued the ATO was denying natural justice, as the ATO had used test case funding to overturn the AAT outcome. Aid/Watch could also have argued the case demonstrated the necessity for legislation. But even then, the financial prospects were not good: even if Aid/Watch had dropped the case, it could still face the possibility of a $70,000 bill from the ATO (and it seemed unlikely the NGOs that had supported the special leave application would be willing to waste funds on an appeal that was never pursued).
For a fortnight the ATO considered the test case funding application: Aid/Watch sought to exert some pressure, releasing details of the financial 'backstop' and stressing widespread NGO support for the case to be heard, which were reported extensively in the Australian (Callick 2010) . It was only on the evening of the Thursday before the 2010 Easter Bank Holiday that the Aid/Watch lawyers finally took a call, from the Assistant Commissioner himself, saying that after some deliberation, the ATO had decided to fund the case. This was an important moment for Aid/Watch. With the ATO funding the case, Aid/Watch was assured its lawyers would be paid, and that Aid/Watch would be indemnified against the ATO's costs should the appeal fail.
Maurice Blackburn could prepare the full High Court appeal.
At this stage Aid/Watch was still arguing within the frame of charity law, that charitable activity could be political and should not be construed as a dominant purpose. In late 2010, for instance,
Aid/Watch had made a submission to the Productivity Commission Inquiry into 'The
Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector', arguing that the government should adopt the Sheppard Inquiry recommendations so that charities could engage in 'lobbying, research and monitoring' as well as direct service provision (Goodman 2009 ). In hindsight, Aid/Watch had begun to believe its own legal arguments, basing the approach on the existing charity law, rather than on in-principle commitments. What had been a legal strategy in the service of a political principle had become a legal dispute on the finer points of charity law.
The appeal papers submitted to the High Court -both the Application for Special Leave to Here, the Aid/Watch lawyers and barristers raised the legal stakes beyond these limits of charity law, and very effectively reframed the case. In part this reflected the High Court jurisdiction, where broader questions of political principle could be translated into legal arguments around constitutional rights. It also reflected the public interest focus of the lawyers, and the extent to which they were able to reframe the case in constitutional terms. In the process, at the High Court hearing they were able to capture the legal agenda, and put the ATO lawyers onto the defensive. A similar move emerged with the ATO's argument that Aid/Watch did not serve the public benefit. The ATO barrister spent some time asserting that Aid/Watch was not effective in discharging its responsibilities, and that this meant it could not be described as having public benefit. The Bench responded by asking how the question of effectiveness was relevant to purposes. Again, it appeared the ATO's main reason for making these assertions was to discredit
Aid/Watch in a context where the organisation could not effectively respond.
The key argument remained: the common law of charity in Australia had to move with the times.
Given the legislature had failed to act in this area, it was up to the High Court to resolve a potential clash between the constitutionally-entrenched freedom of political communication, and the existing law of charity. One had to give way to the other.
The majority judgement, 5-7, when it came in December 2010, favoured the constitutional norm:
it overturned the Federal Court judgement, finding in favour of Aid/Watch, and updating the common law on charity to make it consistent with freedom of political communication. Departure from English common law was necessary as it had not been developed with regard to the 'Australian system and government established and maintained by the Constitution itself'; reflecting that system, the High Court ruled that 'the generation by lawful means of public debate… itself is a purpose beneficial to the community' (High Court of Australia 2010d, paras 40 and 47). In the process, the High Court established a distinctive Australian law on charitable advocacy, of great significance both for the sector and for broader questions of political engagement and 'agitation' in Australia, and internationally; as The Australian put it, 'the 'implied right is back in business' (Pelly 2010 Aid/Watch… an entity can be charitable if it has a purpose (including a sole purpose) of generating public debate with a view to influencing legislation, government activities or government policy in relation to subject matters that come within one or more of the four heads of charity' (ATO 2011a, para 68(i)). Importantly, there was no requirement to present a balanced position: 'an entity does not necessarily have to present a balanced position in order to be considered an entity with a purpose of generating public debate' (ATO 2011a, para 68(iii)). There was some uncertainty about areas of public policy and public debate that may sit outside the four heads of charity, to be decided 'on a case by case basis'; there was also a requirement that charitable political purposes involve public debate, not private lobbying, and not party-political activity. and indeed by political organizations seeking charitable status, they will surely wither on the vine.
Setting aside the on-going drama of defining charitable status, this account of legal and political activism by one small NGO has been aimed at detailing the contingent character of the political and legal process. Nothing in this narrative was given from the outset -the foundations for legal change were created in the process of contestation. As such, what the narrative reveals is a process of strategizing and translating across legal and political fields in order to accumulate forms of leverage. There is no evidence here that political pressure influenced the legal outcomes, rather, we see political activism laying and re-laying the foundations that enabled various levels 9 The new Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission, which was to oversee the implementation of the new definition, was expected to generate $41m in tax revenue over four years; one legal firm speculated that the only means of achieving this would be for Treasury to 'narrow the scope of charitable activity in its definition of Charity and have the Commission take a hard line'; see Corney and Lind 2011. 10 
